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Abstract In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ 
criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and 
aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample 
given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing 
to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when 
properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible non-
existence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its inten-
tional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.
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In 2008 Crane replies to an attack (Nes 2008) to his claim that the 
mental features of directedness plus aspectual shape constitute the 
mark of the intentional (Crane 2001). This attack appeals to the idea 
that dispositions satisfy the very same criteria. Crane says that Nes’ 
attack does not actually work (Crane 2008). For, according to him, in 
allegedly catching the mark of the dispositional, the attack basical-
ly ends up providing allegedly necessary and jointly sufficient condi-
tions yet of the different linguistic phenomenon of intensionality. For 
this reason, he adds, it is not surprising that sophisticating the lin-
guistic versions of such criteria by appealing to hyperintensionality 
or further linguistic machineries does not work either, as Nes him-
self stressed. Since however such linguistic versions may appear as 
counterparts of his two mental criteria, he finally tries to strength-
en such criteria by appealing to representationality as a further nec-
essary and (along with the other two) jointly sufficient condition of 
intentionality.
In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that such a strengthen-
ing does not work. Moreover, I will stress that the two original cri-
teria provided by Crane are perfectly fine when properly meant in 
mental terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the pos-
sible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional 
object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them. In 
this respect, the linguistic approach to such issues that I gave in Vol-
tolini (2005), which appeals to existential unloadedness and pseudo-
opacity, yields merely the adequate linguistic counterparts of such 
mental criteria.
The architecture of this paper is the following. In section 1, I will 
try to show why neither Nes’ attack to Crane’s criteria nor Crane’s 
strengthening of them work. In section 2 I will try to show how 
Crane’s original criteria work when appropriately meant in mental 
terms. Section 3 concludes.
2 Dispositions Do Not Threaten the Traditional Mark  
of Intentionality
According to Crane (2001, 2013), objectual intentionality or inten-
tionality of reference, the property for an intentional state, a thought, 
to be about something, must be distinguished from intentionality of 
content, the property for a thought to have a content that determines 
I thank Anna Marmodoro, Andrea Raimondi and Elisabetta Sacchi for their very use-
ful comments to a previous version of this paper.
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its satisfaction conditions (Kim 1996), since the former is more basic 
than the latter. By actually focusing on intentionality of reference,1 
Crane says further, as a property of mental states intentionality is 
characterized by two features that are its necessary and jointly suf-
ficient conditions; namely, directedness – the fact that thoughts may 
be both about something that exists and about something that does 
not exist – and aspectual shape – the fact that what one thinks about 
presents itself under a perspective, or an aspect. If intentionality is 
further taken, à la Brentano (1874), as the mark of the mental – the 
claim that all and only mental states are intentional – as Crane also 
wishes, then directedness and aspectual shape constitute that mark 
as well. For the purposes of this paper, following Crane himself (2008, 
215), I can however put this further issue aside (for my skepticism on 
the claim, cf. Voltolini 2013b).
Recently, Nes (2008) has maintained that such criteria do not pro-
vide jointly sufficient conditions of intentionality. For even disposi-
tions satisfy them: they have both directedness and aspectual shape. 
In Nes’ own example, take the disposition to attract a metal pretzel. 
Says Nes,
[e]ven if there are no metal pretzels, something may be disposed 
to attract a metal pretzel. And even if the extension of “metal pret-
zel” is the same as the extension of “passion for shrimp-flavoured 
ice-cream”, i.e. the empty set, the true report:
(1) The ball is disposed to attract a metal pretzel
is not equivalent to:
(2) The ball is disposed to attract a passion for shrimp-flavoured 
ice-cream. (2008, 209; sentence numbering changed)
By paraphrasing Place (1996),2 one might say that in looking for the 
mark of the intentional, one has actually found the mark of the dis-
positional. Yet as Crane himself stresses (2008, 216), there is an easy 
way for him to rule out the counterexample, which in point of fact was 
already presented in similar terms by Martin, Pfeifer (1986). If, as 
Nes actually does, we consider dispositions in terms of their linguis-
tic reports, it is easy to see why such reports do not provide jointly 
1 Intentionality of content is indeed characterized not only by directedness and as-
pectual shape, but also by the fact that – as Fodor (1987) puts it – representations can 
be true as well as false, or in other terms, intentional states have the content they have 
independently of whether the satisfaction conditions determined by that content are 
indeed satisfied.
2 Even though for him things are actually more complicated. See the following footnote.
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sufficient conditions of intentionality. For, as many people along with 
Crane himself (2001) have underlined (starting from Kneale 1968 and 
Searle 1983), the linguistic phenomena that feature such reports, i.e. 
failure of existential generalization on the one hand and failure of sub-
stitutivity salva veritate on the other hand, are no criteria for singling 
out the genuine linguistic counterparts of intentional states; name-
ly, adequate reports of such states, intentional reports. Instead, they 
constitute a mark of the more general linguistic phenomenon of in-
tensionality, which affects dispositional reports just as modal or nom-
ic statements, intensional contexts in general.3 As a result, comments 
Crane, it is no surprise that Nes is right in holding that even linguis-
tic refinements of the above features, such as those involving hyper-
intensionality or what Nes calls Russellian meanings (the contribution 
to the structured Russellian propositions expressed by the sentenc-
es in which the relevant terms figure) (2008, 213), do not work either.
So far, so good. Yet these considerations notwithstanding, Crane 
wants to take this counterexample seriously. Probably because he 
feels that, even if it is stated in improperly linguistic terms, it may 
indirectly undermine his two aforementioned mental criteria for in-
tentionality, directedness and aspectual shape, as being jointly in-
sufficient as well. For, he says, “in broad outline, the intensionality 
of the ingredients of reason is the logical expression or reflection of 
these two ideas” (2001, 13). In this respect, he adds a further condi-
tion to his two criteria of intentionality, i.e. representationality. For 
“a representation can represent something that does not exist, and 
[…] when something is represented it is represented under some as-
pect or other” (2008, 216), while dispositions do not represent the 
phenomena manifesting them.
One may however wonder whether appealing to representationali-
ty, as Crane does, really helps. For on the one hand, talking of repre-
sentation is just another way of cashing out the idea that intentional 
states, in their being the kind of states they are (hence, in their hav-
ing a certain mode), are about something or have a content (Searle 
1983, 12). Thus, speaking of intentional or of representational states 
basically amounts to the same thing. This is shown by the linguistic 
facts that, in talking about content, people often indifferently labels 
it intentional or representational content, and that, in describing the 
philosophical position that takes all mental states to be intentional 
states, people often indifferently refer to it as intentionalism or rep-
resentationalism. So meant, representationality can hardly work as 
3 Place (1996) puts forward an intermediate position. For even if he states that the 
genuine criteria for intentionality are actually the mark of the dispositional, he rules 
out aspectual shape as contributing, once linguistically conceived, to mark intension-
ality instead.
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a further criterion of intentionality.4 On the other hand, by talking of 
representation one may mean the more specific idea that thoughts are 
relations to representations, to be understood as the physical vehicles 
(typically located in one’s brain) that are endowed either with about-
ness or with content. Yet it would be hard to appeal to this more fine-
grained conception of representation. For it would amount to take 
as a criterion of intentionality what in point of fact constitutes just 
the tenet of a specific theory of thoughts, the so-called representa-
tional theory of mind, a version of the classical computational theo-
ry of mind (cf. e.g. Fodor 1981). For one may well hold that a thought 
is qualified by directedness and aspectual shape without espousing 
the further idea that it is so qualified in virtue of its standing in a 
(typically computational) relation with a representational yet physi-
cal vehicle having those features.
Perhaps there are further ways of cashing out what for Crane 
representationality amounts to. At the very beginning of his book 
(2001), he says that having a mind, in its being basically featured by 
intentionality, amounts to having a point of view on the world (Crane 
2001, 4-6). Yet appealing to the idea of a point of view is hardly use-
ful in this context. For either it is just another way of pointing out 
that thoughts have aspectual shape, and therefore it does not mobi-
lize any further feature of intentionality, or it is something that hard-
ly qualifies thoughts as such, whether it further appeals to the idea 
that objects or contents of a thought are presented to the thought’s 
subject (McGinn 1997), an idea that properly applies just to percep-
tual experiences, or it appeals to the similar idea that experiential 
thoughts are, or involve, representations for a subject (Kriegel 2013), 
an idea that rules out unconscious thoughts.
3 Why the Traditional Mark Works
In point of fact, if one reflects on what the traditional marks of in-
tentionality, directedness and aspectual shape, actually amount to 
from a straightforwardly mental point of view, one can better under-
stand why dispositions are no counterexample to them. For in having 
such features, thoughts are not qualified by mental counterparts of 
the linguistic features of intensional contexts, failure of existential 
generalization and failure of substitutivity salva veritate, which in-
stead adequately apply to dispositional reports as bona fide cases of 
intensional contexts. Instead, directedness and aspectual shape are 
other mental features; namely, the possible nonexistence of the ob-
4 Even more problematically, for Martin and Pfeifer even dispositions represent in this 
sense (1986, 541). For other criticisms to Crane on this point, cf. Raimondi, unpublished.
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ject of a thought, its intentional object as the tradition has labeled it, 
and its possible apparent aspectuality. In their turn, so meant these 
features are linguistically matched by corresponding linguistic fea-
tures, let me call them existential unloadedness and pseudo-opacity, 
which properly apply just to intentional reports, as I said elsewhere 
(Voltolini 2005).
Let me start from directedness. Appearances notwithstanding, 
directedness is not the mental fact that there may be no object for a 
thought. Instead, it is the mental fact that the object of a thought may 
exist just as may not exist: the possible nonexistence of the intention-
al object. By contrast, dispositions are not qualified by directedness 
so meant. Granted, dispositions may be individuated, if not in a met-
aphysical at least in a weaker epistemic sense, in terms of their pos-
sible manifestations. For example, fragility is the capacity for some-
thing to be broken, which if it does not metaphysically depend on this 
possible manifestation,5 at least it is epistemically identified by means 
of it. Yet a disposition is such that it may have no object at all with 
which such a possible manifestation is related. Pace Nes (2008), this 
is not the same as what would be a proper directedness for disposi-
tions, if there were any (which is not the case); namely, the idea that 
they may have an existent as well as a nonexistent object. On behalf 
of the dispositionalist, one may reply that such an object of a dispo-
sition is the possible manifestation itself: a possible event is what the 
disposition is directed upon (Martin, Pfeifer 1986; Place 1996).6 Yet 
again, insofar as there may be no object at all the possible manifes-
tation is related with, this possible event is just a generic, not a sin-
gular item, as the object an intentional state is directed upon is in-
stead taken7 to be. This difference is linguistically captured by their 
distinct kinds of reports, the intentional vs the dispositional reports.
Let me clarify this point by means of examples. Sean Connery may 
think of Nicola Sturgeon, the present Scottish First Minister that ac-
5 This dependence can be further meant either in a weaker modal, existential, sense, or 
in a stronger essentialist, ontological, sense. For more on these senses cf. e.g. Fine 1995.
6 For a metaphysical, strong, sense of individuation of dispositions in terms of their 
possible manifestations, cf. e.g. Bird 2007. By specifying what Martin and Pfeifer (1986) 
maintain, Place (1996) instead claims that a further criterion that contribute to single 
out dispositionality is the weaker epistemic identification of something in terms of its 
object; precisely, its possible manifestation. Crane himself flirts with this idea when he 
says that dispositions are individuated, in a weak, non ontologically committal sense, 
by their possible manifestations, just as thoughts are individuated, in the very same 
sense, by intentional objects (forthcoming; 2001, 25-6). Yet not even this weak epistem-
ically individuative sense of directedness captures the sense of directedness that is in-
volved in the criterion for intentionality. For this latter sense is not epistemic, but phe-
nomenological (if not also ontological), as we will see later: it (possibly correctly) looks 
to one that one’s state is about something independently of whether it actually exists.
7 Or even felt: see later.
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tually exists, just as he may think of Nessie, the alleged Loch Ness 
monster that actually does not exist. In both cases, there is some-
thing, namely Nicola and Nessie respectively, Sean thinks about; yet 
simply, in the second case, unlike the first case, that very something 
does not exist. This is linguistically captured not by the idea that a 
sentence like:
(3) Sean thinks of Nessie (who does not exist)
elicits no existential generalization, as is traditionally said (e.g. 
Smith, McIntyre 1982; Searle 1983; and even Crane himself 2001), 
but rather (see Sainsbury 2018, and even Crane himself 2013) by the 
fact that it elicits a particular, nonexistentially loaded, quantifica-
tion. Indeed, from (3) one can validly infer:
(4) Hence, there is something, namely Nessie, Sean thinks about 
(who does not exist).
Clearly enough, the validity of this inference shows that in the above 
case there is no failure of existential generalization. For what is rath-
er involved is a particular generalization existentially unloaded – ex-
istential unloadedness, for short (McGinn 2000, 2004).8 For it ranges 
upon an overall domain of individuals independently of whether they 
exist or not. While in the dispositional case, existential generaliza-
tion fails tout court. For, to come back to Nes’ example:
(1) The ball is disposed to attract a metal pretzel
(5) Hence, there is a metal pretzel the ball is disposed to attract
is an invalid inference, even if “there is” is given a non-existentially 
loaded reading. Indeed, there is no metal pretzel, even in an existen-
tially unloaded sense, the ball is disposed to attract. Granted, in ex-
tensional contexts the description “a metal pretzel” actually denotes 
the empty set. Yet in (1) it has a merely possible denotation, but it ac-
tually denotes no actually nonexistent item, not even a possible indi-
8 Note that in order to account for this situation there is no need to resort à la Priest 
(2016) to two different ‘existential’ quantifying items respectively meant by different 
expressions, an existential (“there exists”) and a particular (“some”) one. For, in try-
ing to capture the linguistic counterpart of the possible nonexistence of the intention-
al object, one may say that precisely the same kind of inference mobilizing just the very 
same quantifier holds from “Sam thinks of Nicole (who exists)” to “There is someone, 
namely Nicole, Sam thinks of (who exists)”. Simply in this case, one may contextually 
use the very same quantifier restrictedly, as ranging over just the subdomain of exist-
ents. For more about this see Voltolini 2018.
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vidual. For it is indeterminate what that possible denotation amounts 
to, as Kaplan (1973, 505-8; 1989, 609) originally stressed by raising 
the problem of the insufficient specificity for an actually unsatisfied 
description to single out a certain possible denotatum. Consider a 
possible world w that contains a metal pretzel (to be attracted by the 
relevant ball) and a possible world w’ that contains a metal pretzel 
(to be attracted by such a ball) as well. Are such possible metal pret-
zels the same thing or not? There is no fact of the matter as to how 
this question could be answered.9 As a result, the step from the de 
dicto reading conveyed by (1) to the de re reading stated by (5) is il-
legitimate.10 Clearly enough, in fact, unlike (3) no plausible existen-
tial generalization of any sort generalization, not even a particular 
one existentially unloaded, does come out of the infinitival expres-
sion “to attract a metal pretzel” occurring in (1).11
Ditto for aspectual shape. Appearances notwithstanding, aspec-
tual shape is not the mental fact that it is indeterminate whether 
two thoughts are about the same object, but it is the mental fact that 
two thoughts are about different intentional objects that may fur-
ther appear as aspects of the very same thing: the possible apparent 
aspectuality of the intentional object. By contrast, dispositions are 
not qualified by aspectual shape so meant. For dispositions are such 
that it is indeterminate whether an object a possible manifestation 
is related with is the same as another object the manifestation is re-
lated with. This is not the same as what would be a proper aspectual 
shape for dispositions if there were any (which is not the case); name-
ly, the idea that there are different objects such possible manifesta-
tions are related with. Nor would resorting to the possible manifes-
tations themselves fare any better: simply, a mere indetermination 
in their identity would arise as well. Again, this difference is linguis-
tically captured by their distinct kinds of reports, the intentional vs 
the dispositional reports.
Again, let me rely on examples. Oedipus may entertain a certain 
thought with respect to a certain intentional object, call it “Jocasta”, 
yet fail to entertain the same kind of thought with respect to another 
intentional object, call it “Mummy”, even if both objects may further 
9 I take that the indeterminacy in question is metaphysical. Yet nothing would change 
if it were semantical, i.e. it involved a conceptual failure in the description of the rel-
evant possible world. At any rate, clearly enough it is not epistemic, i.e. it has nothing 
to do with a failure in identification.
10 Cf. Smith, McIntyre (1982, 30-3), who precisely tie this failure of existential gen-
eralization (which is for me the only genuine failure that there is) to the illegitimacy 
of passing from a de dicto to a de re reading of the relevant sentence. Unfortunately, 
they connect this illegitimacy with an unnecessary distinction between indefinite and 
definite intentions.
11 As Place himself (1996, 104) implicitly acknowledges.
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appear as aspects of the same thing, Jocasta-aka-Mummy. Sticking to 
reports of objectual intentional states (but the same result would be 
obtained if one mobilized reports of propositional intentional states), 
this is linguistically captured by the fact that (pace Freud) the true:
(6) Oedipus craves for Jocasta
is matched by the false:
(7) Oedipus craves for Mummy.
For in such contexts, the ordinarily coreferring names “Jocasta” and 
“Mummy” respectively refer to different intentional objects that may 
further appear as aspects of one and the same thing, Jocasta-aka-
Mummy. Thus, as Frege (1892) originally captured,12 in (6)-(7) there 
is no failure of substitutivity salva veritate. For there is no referential 
opacity, but just pseudo-opacity (Voltolini 2005). Indeed appearanc-
es notwithstanding, the names do not corefer there, for instead they 
refer to different intentional objects, respectively named there “Jo-
casta” and “Mummy”. While in the dispositional case, there is such 
a failure viz proper referential opacity. Suppose one goes back to:13
(1) The ball is disposed to attract a metal pretzel.
(2) The ball is disposed to attract a passion for shrimp-flavoured 
ice-cream.
Granted, in extensional contexts the two descriptions “a metal pret-
zel” and “a passion for shrimp-flavoured ice-cream” actually code-
note the empty set. Yet unlike what happens in (6)-(7), in (1)-(2) such 
descriptions do not actually denote different (actually nonexistent) 
objects; they merely have possible denotations of which is indetermi-
nate whether they are identical. Indeed, it is indeterminate wheth-
er there is just one attractable metal pretzel across unactual possi-
ble worlds as well as whether there is just one passion-attractable 
shrimp-flavoured ice-cream across such worlds, hence whether they 
12 Actually, Frege was committed to a metaphysical picture of intentional objects as 
Sinne, i.e. abstract objects of a certain kind. Yet this is irrelevant for my present pur-
poses (see later).
13 This can be better seen in Martin and Pfeifer’s example, where the two disposi-
tional reports respectively involve two definite descriptions, “‘the only pink object O 
at L’” and “‘the only object M of mass f at L’” (1986, 533), which in extensional contexts 
actually denote the same thing, but in such reports differ in their possible indetermi-
nate denotations.
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are identical.14 As a further result, it is indeterminate as well whether 
to the two infinitival expressions “to attract a metal pretzel” and “to 
attract a passion for shrimp-flavoured ice-cream” single out different 
possible events. All in all, the fact that (1) has a certain truth-value 
is no guarantee for (2), which turns out from the mere substitution 
of the first description with the actually codenoting (in extensional 
contexts) second description, to have the same truth-value.15
At this point, however, one may wonder what makes it the case 
that the above characterizations of directedness and aspectual shape 
are mental characterizations. In response, note that, in so mobiliz-
ing the notion of an intentional object as involved both in directed-
ness and aspectual shape adequately meant, I have not relied on any 
metaphysical characterization of such objects, nor have I ontologi-
cally committed to them. Instead, by following Crane (2001, 2013) 
and Woodling (2016a, 2016b), I have simply stuck to the phenomeno-
logical characterization of such objects, as is captured by the three 
following theses:
a) every intentional state is about an intentional object, i.e. there 
is an intentional object for any intentional state independently of 
whether it exists;
b) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is 
a schematic object, i.e. it is an object that has no particular meta-
physical nature insofar as it is thought of;
c) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a 
phenomenological object, i.e. an object for the subject of the inten-
tional state: more precisely, it is what that subject takes (or even 
feels) that state to be about.
According to these theses, on the one hand, in the first example above 
Nessie is the object of Sean’s thought, even if it does not exist. On 
the other hand, in the second example, Jocasta and Mummy are the 
two different intentional objects of Oedipus’ relevant thoughts, inso-
far as for a long while Oedipus has not recognized that they further 
appear as aspects of one and the same thing, Jocasta-aka-Mummy. 
14 See fn. 9.
15 Both Martin, Pfeifer (1986) and Place (1996) appeal to a further criterion that trac-
es back to Anscombe (1965), the so-called indeterminacy of the intentional object, in or-
der to again hold that also this criterion contributes to single out dispositionality, not 
intentionality. Yet the only plausible sense in which the criterion qualifies intentional 
objects, which is epistemic – namely, the idea that the subject of an intentional state 
may not know of certain properties whether they are possessed or not by a certain in-
tentional object – does not qualify dispositions.
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This is what tragically reveals itself to be the case when Oedipus fi-
nally discovers that Jocasta is the same as Mummy.16
Granted, it is an utterly different issue to settle what intentional 
objects metaphysically really are, and whether there really are such 
objects from an ontological point of view. Personally on the one hand, 
as I stressed elsewhere (cf. e.g. Voltolini 2013a), I believe with Crane 
(2001, 2013) that out of their being thought of, intentional objects are 
metaphysically various. Pace Crane, on the other hand, I also believe 
that the answer as to the issue of whether there really are, ontolog-
ically speaking, such metaphysically various intentional objects, de-
pends on the issue of whether we are already ontologically commit-
ted to objects of the respective metaphysical kind. Sometimes, the 
answer to this question is typically positive – e.g. when intentional 
objects are concreta – yet some other times we are uncertain on what 
is the right answer to it – e.g. when intentional objects are ficta – and 
some further times the answer is typically negative – e.g. when inten-
tional objects are impossibilia. Yet someone else may have utterly dif-
ferent both metaphysical and ontological convictions on these issues.
Fortunately enough, however, in order to settle the issue of wheth-
er directedness and aspectual shape are necessary and jointly suffi-
cient conditions of intentionality (of reference), we do not have to en-
ter into these metaphysical and ontological controversies. For even if 
phenomenology is the last guide neither to metaphysics nor to ontol-
ogy, directedness and aspectual shape must still qualify intentional-
ity, by mobilizing the proper metaphysico-ontological counterparts of 
intentional objects, whatever they are. Thus, meaning such features 
phenomenologically, as above, is enough in order for them to work as 
the mark of the intentional, not of the dispositional.17
16 For more about this (in particular, why the weak sameness relation between dif-
ferent intentional objects is not the same as the strong identity relation between an 
object and itself, an idea originally defended brilliantly by Castañeda 1989), cf. e.g. 
Voltolini 2016.
17 If one claims that metaphysically, intentionality amounts to the essential thought-
object relation of constitution, as I do (cf. Sacchi, Voltolini 2012; Voltolini 2015), the idea 
that directedness and aspectual shape must be phenomenologically meant as I have 
just done is further corroborated. Incidentally, this claim does not reintroduce the is-
sue of distinguishing intentionality from dispositionality from the rear door. For even 
if one appeals to the strong metaphysical sense of individuation as ontological depend-
ence in order to understand the relation between dispositions and their possible man-
ifestations (see fnn. 5-6), the constitution relation holding between a thought and its 
object (or content) is even stronger than that. For, unlike possible manifestations of a 
disposition, the object is an essential part of its thought. Yet for this paper’s purposes 
I can leave these matters aside.




In this paper, I have tried to show that, when properly meant, i.e. 
phenomenologically, as involving intentional objects that may not ex-
ist and may further appear as aspects of other things, Crane’s crite-
ria of intentionality (notably, reference intentionality), directedness 
and aspectual shape, resist Nes’ counterexamples appealing to dis-
positions. Thus, in order to find the mark of the intentional we do not 
need to resort to a further alleged yet unclear feature of intention-
ality, representationality, as Crane instead thinks.
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